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NATIONALITY AS A STIGMA:  
THE DRAWBACKS OF NATIONALITY 
(WHAT DO I HAVE TO DO WITH BOOK-BURNERS?)
Boldizsár Nagy1
ABSTRACT The study deals with two related issues: first with the conundrum of 
the Hungarian law on nationality and voting rights; second with instances when 
nationality acts as a stigma. It has two major propositions. First, the Hungarian 
law on nationality and elections does not lead to any reasonable conclusion 
concerning who constitutes the Hungarian political community, as millions of 
Hungarian nationals are practically excluded – but an ever increasing crowd of 
people who have never lived in Hungary but are descendants of nationals of the 
Hungarian Kingdom (and who are therefore entitled to preferential naturalization 
and rewarded with voting rights), are. So a clearly ethnic-cultural nationalist 
discourse has led to the adoption of a system of rules which in essence serves 
one purpose: the creation of a faithful clientele. Second, nationality in the present 
form, usually based on ius sanguinis and ius soli is not tenable from the moral- and 
political-philosophical point of view as it does not differ from a feudal privilege, 
also determined by accident of birth into a family or in one place. The specific 
burdens that differentiate nationals from settled foreigners are also reviewed in 
this paper. The conclusion is that nationality should be reformulated along the 
lines of Rainer Bauböck and Ayelet Shachar’s thinking; that is, rights entailed in 
nationality should derive from attachment to a given community, and from the fact 
that the decisions of the body politic directly affect the person.
KEYWORDS nationality, political community, voting rights, stigma, feudal 
privileges, ius sanguinis, ius soli 
1  Boldizsár Nagy is associate professor of international law at CEU and ELTE; e-mail: 
nagyboldi@ajk.elte.hu. This paper is based on a lecture held at the conference ”Nationality, 
naturalisation, integration – 20 years of the nationality law” held at the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences on 25 November 2013. A Hungarian version of this text appears in Regio. The author 
is grateful to Adam Barkl who kindly assisted with improving the paper’s language style.
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A DIFFERENT LOOK AT THE INSTITUTION OF 
NATIONALITY
Hungarian public discourse presents nationality as a gift. Whoever gets 
it should feel as if they have been blessed. Whoever does not partake of it 
looks as if they are cut off from the body of the nation. However, whenever 
someone of a non-Hungarian ethnic background wishes to be naturalised, 
then a question pops up: “Whyever does this individual wish to get closer 
(enter, immigrate) to the land of Hungarians (of Hungarian nationals)?” 
The purpose of this study is to take a different look at nationality, put down 
the lens of the EU citizen living in a (more or less) welfare state, ignore for 
a moment the indoctrination of 19th century nationalism that is obsessed 
with state-building and dreaming of ethnically homogenous nation-states, 
and investigate the possible drawbacks attached to certain nationalities. The 
aim is to identify the disadvantages of an individual being identified with 
a random set of people (a group of fellow nationals) rather than with her 
own character, deeds, past and ambitions. Identification along the lines of 
nationality is nothing but an institutionalised prejudice: if someone is a 
national of a state, and she has violated the rules (on immigration, legal stay, 
employment, etc.) of another state, then her fellow national presumably is also 
a potential violator of those laws. Therefore  the decision maker of that state 
(visa-authority, immigration officer, confidentiality or reliability assessor) 
should refuse, exclude, or keep away that other person, who actually has not 
committed any offence (yet).
Of course, Hannah Arendt and the demand to have the right to enjoy rights 
are not forgotten,2 neither is the misery entailed in statelessness lost sight 
of.3 Therefore this study does not attack the existence and use of nationality; 
neither does it challenge the fact that possession of a nationality is a human 
right.4 Statelessness makes one even more defenceless than the worst 
nationality. 
2  ”We became aware of the existence of a right to have rights (and that means to live in a 
framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions) and a right to belong to some 
kind of organized community, only when millions of people emerged who had lost and could 
not regain these rights…” Arendt (1958:297-298
3  An unusual source, The Supreme Court of the UK: ”The evil of statelessness became better 
understood following the re-drawing of national boundaries at the end of the two world wars 
of the twentieth century and following, for example, the Reich Citizenship Law dated 15 
September 1935 which provided that all Jewish people should be stripped of their citizenship 
of the German Reich” Al Jedda v SSHD [2013] UKSC 62., 12. para. See also: Molnár (2014)
4 Article 24 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
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The starting point of this study may best be illustrated by the following 
(partly hypothetical) example: let us assume that a genuinely democratic state’s 
government notes that in November 2013 in Hungary presumably fascist – 
certainly anti-Semitic – Hungarian nationals burned books, among others, 
those of Miklós Radnóti, one of Hungary’s greatest poets, killed because of 
his Jewish background in 1944.5 The law enforcement agencies did not act. 
No state retorsion was initiated. Let us assume that this genuinely democratic 
state becomes convinced that if these activities be remain unsanctioned in 
Hungary, then all Hungarian nationals must be infected with the virus of 
fascism and anti-Semitism and so should never get an entry or immigration 
permit into that democratic state. Only through this drastic measure can 
potential Hungarian immigrants or visitors be prevented from shocking the 
inhabitants of the democratic country and challenging their conviction that all 
human beings, without exception, are equal.
That hypothetical step, a total ban on entry, would, beyond doubt, be 
followed by a storm of indignation in Hungary. Protest would claim that, 
“Those Hungarian nationals are different, and we have nothing to do with 
them. Their vicious views are not shared. Let us be assessed according to our 
own standpoints.”
The question is the following: on what basis does the one who does not 
identify herself with her barbaric fellow nationals group together, as it may 
be, a billion persons with those few ten-thousands, who may have committed 
much smaller misdeeds, such as overstaying their visas or taking illegal 
employment? How can full communities of other nationals be designated as 
risky, when in one’s own case this is exactly the target of passionate protest?
This study confronts this dilemma. In our own cases we are ready to 
identify with the better sides of our nation and project our dark sides onto 
an imagined other6, whereas nationals of other nations are frequently judged 
by the reprehensible acts of their fellow nationals, while having their virtues 
ignored. 
Nationality is like stigma: a stamp, a sign, which literally refers to the 
branding of animals or slaves, but which in the Christian world also refers to 
the chosen; those who have Jesus’ wounds appear on them, those who feel his 
pain (Goffman, 1963:1,4). Nationality similarly has a dual character: it may 
entail being branded, excluded or designated as inferior, but it may also reflect 
5 See: http://jovonk.info/2013/11/15/megtisztulas-ejszakaja-miskolcon (2014-07-25)
6  A recent example of this dual vision is the monument set up in Budapest in Szabadság Square 
which it is claimed refers to the victims of the German occupation of Hungary in 1944, but is 
regarded by many as an effort to whitewash Hungarian participation in fascist crimes.
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the idea of being chosen. The dominant perspective depends on, first, where 
the individual is born, and second, on the viewpoint of the assessing agent: 
does she see in the foreigner the scary “other” or does the motive to find a 
common blood and ancestry dominate – the need to find a shared mystical 
identity based on tribal belonging?
This study has a dual agenda. First, it proves that Hungarian legislation on 
nationality has lost its direction and is maintaining an inconsistent system 
which is unintelligible from the political philosophical point of view. Second, 
expanding the horizon, it engages with the fact that the majority of the world’s 
population is excluded from a better life or meaningful self-determination. 
They are excluded from freedom by their nationality. 
THE CONTEXT OF NATIONALITY: STATE, NATION, 
BODY POLITIC – COMPLETE CONFUSION IN HUNGARY 
Who constitutes the state? Who are the people that are the source of public 
power? Who belongs to the Hungarian nation? And of whom is the body 
politic constituted? The Hungarian legislator has created chaos in the last 
two decades which has culminated in the adoption of amendments to the 
nationality law and the new law on elections.7
In 2001 the conservative government (whose personal constitution hardly 
differed from the one that existed between 2010 and 2014) still made a clear 
difference between the support granted to those chosen on an ethnic basis and 
the support given to those who freely declared themselves ethnic Hungarian by 
way of individual self-identification. It condemned the former and approved 
the latter. The government stressed that the benefits granted by the law to 
Hungarians living in the neighbouring countries (the Status-law)8 cannot be 
compared to dual nationality granted on an ethnic basis to persons living 
in neighbouring countries, as the latter would have irredentist overtones. It 
stated: “When drawing up this piece of legislation, the Hungarian Government 
– and indeed the Parliament which adopted the Act by a 92% majority – set 
aside all aspirations for any kind of dual citizenship for persons belonging to 
Hungarian national minorities and living in the neighbouring countries, and 
instead preferred a system based on co-operation ... Hungary is convinced 
that this Act confirms [in] the most apparent way the refutation of any kind of 
7  Act No. XLIV of 2010 amending Act No. LV. of 1993 on nationality and Act No. CCIII. of 
2011 setting out the new rules on the election of members of Parliament
8 Act LXII. of 2001. on Hungarians living in neighbouring states
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territorial revision as a ‘solution’ for questions raised by national minorities.” 
(Point 1.8.) “In fact, the Act recognises that Hungarians abroad are citizens 
of the relevant states and clearly rejects the idea that the self-identification 
as Hungarians can be based on dual citizenship. ... In the expression of its 
kin-state role, Hungary has always acknowledged that it has no citizen-like 
relationship whatsoever with Hungarians living in the neighbouring countries 
when dealing with them.” (Points 2.3 and 6.1.) (emphasis added).9 
This is no longer the case. According to the new dogma, granting 
nationality to members of the ethnic (national) minority, who continue to 
reside in their original domiciles, promotes the maintenance of contacts with 
the kin-state and the “preservation of Hungarianhood”10. The short (altogether 
11-paragraph-long) explanatory note that accompanies the bill, introducing 
naturalisation on preferential terms, devoted a mere five paragraphs to 
justifying the naturalisation of persons without a residence in Hungary. These 
stated that “among Hungarians living in the world and in the Carpathian basin, 
again and again the demand surfaced in the last 20 years that the introduction 
of naturalisation on a preferential basis – following the examples of other 
countries – would enhance the keeping of contact with the kin state and the 
preservation of Hungarianhood. The purpose of the bill is to assure ‘dual 
nationality’; that is, naturalisation on a preferential basis to Hungarians living 
beyond the border by way of amending Act No. LV. of 1993 on Hungarian 
nationality.” How would mere nationality enhance keeping contact with the 
kin-state, especially if both of them are EU members? What does “preservation 
of Hungarianhood” mean? The explanatory note does not deliver answers to 
these questions; neither does it address the issue of whether those one and a 
half million persons who choose to self-identify as Hungarian but who will not 
apply for naturalisation on preferential terms, are indeed hindered in keeping 
contact with the kin-state. Nor do we learn why preserving “Hungarianhood” 
without applying for nationality would become more cumbersome.
Zsolt Semjén, the competent deputy prime minister, in his speech at the 
Parliament introducing the bill11 referred to national solidarity, the “healing of 
9  Paper containing the position of the Hungarian government in relation to the act on Hungarians 
living in neighbouring countries CDL (2001) 80 Strasbourg, 21 August 2001. Available at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL(2001)080-e  (2014-07-25)
10  “Hungarianhood” is used here and not “Hungarian identity”, because the original Hungarian 
term “magyarság” is so essentialist that its translation as “Hungarian identity” would not 
reflect its primordial connotations.
11  Speech of Zsolt Semjén, deputy prime minister when introducing the amendment to the 
1993 Act on Nationality in: http://www.allampolgarsag.gov.hu/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=142:semjen&catid=43:torveny&Itemid=72 (2014-07-26)
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the wound” of the unsuccessful 2004 referendum12, the correction of the Trianon 
peace treaty that deprived Hungary of 2/3 of its territory after the first World 
War, when – in his words – “a third of the nation was transferred under alien 
jurisdiction”13, and then he went on to claim that the planned Act “does neither 
grant extra rights, nor does it diminish the rights of anyone. Their [Semjén is 
presumably speaking here of the preferentially naturalised] situation is similar 
to other Hungarian nationals living abroad. Accordingly, there is no A and B 
category Hungarian nationality, there is no first class and second class. There is 
one Hungarian nation, there is a single Hungarian nationality.”14 
This change clearly made the Status law on the assistance to Hungarians 
living in the neighbouring countries a truly confusing instrument as it now 
extends to Hungarian nationals who live in neighbouring countries (except 
for Austria) and identify themselves as Hungarians, but its benefits cannot be 
enjoyed by Hungarian nationals who live within Hungary or in other (non-
neighbouring) countries. Neither does it extend (at least formally) to those 
Hungarians who do not “declare themselves to be of Hungarian ethnicity” – to 
use the words of the Status law itself. Curiously enough, the nationality law as 
amended – contrary to its earlier form and to the Status law – does not require 
that the person who is naturalised self-identifies herself as Hungarian. The 
oath that must be sworn avoids any reference to national belonging and limits 
itself to requiring that the naturalised person swear or pledge that she shall 
regard Hungary as her country and shall be a loyal citizen of the Republic of 
Hungary. The new national shall respect and obey the Constitution and the 
laws and shall protect the country as her strength allows, and serve it to the 
best of her ability, so help her God. 
The Government, back in 2001, defended the Status law by claiming that 
the Act “does not have any direct or indirect/implied reference to ’ethnie’ as 
a basis for receiving benefits from the Hungarian state. Ethnic ties are based 
on blood relationships (ius sanguinis) and on association with a ‘homeland’ 
and on the myths of the past. In contrast, the aim of the present Act is to 
promote and preserve the well-being and awareness of the national (language, 
12  http://valasztas.hu/nepszav04/main_hu.html  (2014-05-21) Out of the valid votes 1521271 
were in favour of introducing preferential naturalization and 1428578 against.
13  As a consequence of the Trianon Peace treaty that concluded the First World War, the 
proportion of Hungarians among the whole population grew from 54,5% to 90%. Out of the 
10651481 persons living on the territory which became subject to new jurisdiction, 3221003 
were of Hungarian ethnicity. This is less than 30%. Who had been and who remained members 
of the Hungarian nation, then?! Data source: Tóth Pál Péter (1997:29)
14  http://www.allampolgarsag.gov.hu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id= 
142:semjen&catid=43:torveny&Itemid=72   (2014-07-26)
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cultural) identity of Hungarians within their home (neighbouring) country.”15 
In contrast, the introduction of preferential naturalisation in 2010 and the 
extension of voting rights in 2013 to those who do not and never did live in 
Hungary invokes the image of a country/people/nation, which is based on 
tribal, blood-based and historical fantasies.
Moreover, – as I will show soon –, somewhat contradicting the essential 
content identified above, the actual rules reflect an imperial attitude, not 
based strictly on descent and blood, but aimed at creating the maximum pool 
of faithful subjects, whatever their ethnic origin. 
Being aware of this, let us have a brief look at the preamble of the Act on 
the election of members of parliament.16 This identifies as its foundations 
“Hungary’s legislative traditions based on popular representation”, 
guarantees that “in Hungary the source of public power shall be the people, 
which shall primarily exercise its power through its elected representatives”, 
claims to ensure “the right of voters to universal and equal suffrage as well 
as to direct and secret ballot” and recognises minorities living in Hungary 
as “constituent parts of the State”. Finally it surprises its readers versed in 
political philosophy with the following statement: “Hungarian citizens living 
beyond the borders of Hungary shall be a part of the political community”. 
Let us reconstruct the underlying logic! Popular representation must refer to 
the representation of the people. The people are the source of popular power. 
Who constitute the people? They are those who exercise their power through 
their chosen representatives (i.e. the electorate). So the “people” include at 
least half a million persons who do not live in Hungary. The people stretch 
beyond the territory. But if that is the case, what kind of popular power do 
they exercise? What kind of legislative traditions support this constellation, 
if not imperial ones? (As a matter of fact, never in the history of Hungary 
were people living abroad entitled to vote. Even many of those who lived 
within the borders were excluded for quite a long time, whenever census was 
applied.) If the Hungarians living beyond the borders are “part of the political 
community”, then what makes it political? Certainly ‘the community’ in this 
case is not a community which legislates for itself and exercises power over 
itself, as those living abroad are not bound by most of the laws adopted by 
their representatives, neither do they participate in social service schemes 
(health care, pensions, etc.). 
15  Paper containing the position of the Hungarian government in relation to the act on 
Hungarians living in neighbouring countries CDL (2001) 80 Strasbourg, 21 August 2001. 
(2.13 point)
16 Act CCIII. of 2011. on the election of members of parliament 
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The political community consists of those who are entitled to participate 
in the political process and are subject to the results of those processes. The 
political community forms the basis of a legal system. This community 
organises and controls its social, economic, and cultural life, and deals with its 
security concerns through the rule of law. The legal order separates friend and 
foe, fixes social development goals, and reflects the community’s perceived 
role in the regional and global processes. 
These conditions do not apply to persons who have continuously lived 
abroad, indeed perhaps have even been born there. Whereas those who may 
be away for a few years may still link their individual fates to the country 
(temporarily) left behind and so have a moral claim to participate in the 
exercise of the popular will (in the same manner as foreigners settled in a 
locality are entitled to participate in local elections precisely because they 
are affected), transforming the cultural-ethnic relationship into a public law 
nexus without sharing the public burdens and without the condition that those 
nationalised are directly affected is incompatible with the role of nationality 
in a democratic legal order (Similarly: Pogonyi, 2011: 696-700).
Let us now return to the imperial character of the whole setup! The 
construction after the amendment of the law on electing members of 
parliament does not rely on an ethnic-cultural nation. In essence, it reflects 
the thinking of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, or in general that of the empires 
of the 19th century. It does not entitle to preferential naturalisation those who 
are Hungarians (assuming that the term “being Hungarian” may meaningfully 
be operationalized), neither does it entitle to preferential treatment those who 
declare themselves Hungarian as a gesture of self-identification. Rather it 
entitles to preferential naturalisation those whose ancestors were Hungarian 
nationals, or who can show in all probability that they descend “from 
Hungary” and can show their Hungarian language knowledge.17 At the time 
of the Trianon peace treaty that concluded the First World War, out of the 
more-than ten million former Hungarian nationals who found themselves 
under foreign jurisdiction after the borders were redrawn, less than a third 
were ethnic Hungarians. Nevertheless, the descendants of all the ten million 
are entitled to preferential naturalisation if they speak a bit of Hungarian. 
If the seven million non-Hungarians of 1920 have at least fourteen million 
descendants today, then more people without any link to Hungarian ethnicity 
or culture are entitled to preferential naturalisation than the whole present 
17  Act LV. of 1993on Hungarian nationality section 4, para (3).. According to para (3a) the spouse 
(of whatever background) of the preferentially-naturalised person can also be so naturalised 
after ten years of marriage. If they have a child between them, five years are enough. 
39NATIONALITY AS A STIGMA: THE DRAWBACKS OF NATIONALITY
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  2 (2014) 
population (9,7 million) of Hungary. To show that this is not a far-fetched 
interpretation of the law, let me quote again the deputy prime minister who 
when submitting the bill tried to show that it was not ethnically-oriented and 
did not prefer the Hungarian ethnie: 
“The Act would be discriminative if it contained ethnic 
differentiation. This Act does not contain ethnic differentiation. 
If, for example a Saxon person from Brasov, whose ancestor 
originates from the Hungarian Kingdom and who speaks at 
some level Hungarian feels that she has to adhere to Hungarian 
traditions, to the heritage of Transylvania, to Hungarian 
culture, then she shall not be excluded from the option to 
acquire Hungarian nationality if she so requests. There is no 
ethnic discrimination so [the Act] does not conflict with any 
EU prescription.”18
The construction is scary: there is no ethnic preference in words, nor in 
the formal rules: language knowledge and imperial descent – these are the 
requirements. Let us project this situation onto Great Britain: whoever has 
an ancestor who was a British subject, or who can make it be believed that 
she originates from the British Empire and speaks a bit of English could be 
entitled to preferential naturalisation. What a colourful crowd could apply to 
become British nationals – presumably about one and a half billion people! 
In reality, this is not what the force that governed the hand of the legislator 
wants. This fact is graphically illustrated by the words of deputy state secretary 
Gyula Budai, uttered at a naturalisation ceremony in Subotica, Serbia: 
“Our fellow nationals beyond the borders are members of our 
nation, on an equal basis with those who live in Hungary. They 
are exactly the same Hungarians, speak the same language, 
preserve the same culture and are nationals of the same Great-
Hungary, which once existed.”19
The confusion could not be more profound. Words of warning come handy 
in such moments: 
“It is an old teaching: what should be the first deed of those who 
start to govern? The answer: the restoration of the right use of 
18  http://www.allampolgarsag.gov.hu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id= 
142:semjen&catid=43:torveny&Itemid=72  (2014-07-26)
19  ”A nyelv ismerete alapvető feltétele a magyar állampolgárság megszerzésének.” (Knowing 
the language is a basic condition of acquiring Hungarian nationality. Report from Vojvodina 
Television. Published on 21 February 2013. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a8zzzvboXoE 
(2014-05-19)
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words. If the use of the words is improper then the meaning of 
the thoughts is murky. If the meaning of the thoughts is murky 
then one cannot act accurately.”20
The right use of the words would require the acceptance of the following:
The cultural-ethnic-historic “nation” – if the term “nation” may carry a 
definite meaning at all – is not limited to the totality of nationals. It includes 
those who live beyond the borders or scattered around the world and have a 
Hungarian identity. For the sake of this statement identity merely refers to the 
fact that they consider themselves (at least partly) Hungarian, although being 
the nationals of another state. 
The set of Hungarian nationals, in contrast, may include persons whose 
ethnic-cultural identity links them to another nation. However, they are part 
of the Hungarian body politic; they belong to the people that exercise supreme 
power.
The total number of Hungarian nationals born abroad (or living there) is 
approximately 3-4 million, who may well ignore their Hungarian nationality. 
They only qualify as Hungarian nationals because of the ius sanguinis 
principle, but for all practical purposes they consider themselves nationals 
of another state. The Hungarian authorities can neither identify nor localize 
them as no register is kept of these nationals. Still, by the force of law, all 
of them are entitled to contact any Hungarian consular representative and 
demand the issuance of a certificate of Hungarian nationality.
The body politic, the political community, is normally made up of the 
voting nationals who live in a country. They (together with non-voting 
family members) are bound together by a common historic venture, they 
recognise each other’s equality and equal dignity even if they have competing 
political visions and consequent aspirations concerning the public good. 
These aspirations are always aimed at the long-term well-being of the whole 
community (the civic nation), not only at realising the particular interests of 
the given political actor. 
The present public law situation does not meet this description of the 
political community. The constituency neither coincides with all the nationals, 
nor with those persons who (permanently) live in Hungary and so form the 
Hungarian society. This lack of a match between the legal situation and 
the meaningful understanding of a political community is the result of the 
following facts:
–  The descendants of the Hungarian nationals who left the country after 
20  Speech of Viktor Orbán at the meeting electing him prime minister, 10 May 2014, Hungarian 
Parliament. 
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1929 did not lose their Hungarian nationality with the passing of time 
or remoteness in generational terms. Ius sanguinis is not limited in its 
operation. Therefore formally all these persons are members of the civic 
nation in the sense that they are entitled to exercise their rights. However, 
the lack of any evidence of their Hungarian nationality and their total 
ignorance of this option practically paralyses them. The state makes no 
steps to inform them or bind them to the country, nor do they wish to have 
meaningful, “genuine and effective” links to it. 
–  The constituency is not limited to people living in Hungary, as the recent 
legislation has opened the way to Hungarian nationality and to partial 
electoral rights for those whose ancestors were Hungarian nationals, 
even if they were not born Hungarians. In their case the operation of the 
ius sanguinis principle was interrupted either by the post First World 
War arrangements accompanying the transfer of the territory, or by the 
Socialist period, when dual nationals had to choose one and terminate the 
other. After 2010, these persons – as already mentioned above – could 
apply for Hungarian nationality through a simplified procedure, and with 
it they got the right to participate in national elections (namely, in list 
voting, without the right to vote in any individual electoral district).
–  Foreigners who have settled in Hungary and who have permanent 
residency (approximately 220 thousand persons) are not entitled to 
participate in either parts of the national election (list or district voting), 
no matter how many years or decades have they shared our fate, no matter 
that they participate in sharing the public burden. They are excluded from 
the body politic, from the concept of the people exercising popular power, 
even if the laws bind them equally with others.
The right use of words has shown that behind the slogan of “unification of 
the nation”, in fact one finds the building of an empire, the construction of a 
clientele (Waterbury, 2010). The actual effect of extending the opportunity 
for naturalisation, accompanied by voting rights, is the creation of a pool of 
loyals; a voting base which recognises the divine delegation of the leader 
who has been brought on the wings of eagles to govern his subjects in the 
right direction, for which he is only grateful to God. Sounds out of date? 
Listen to the words of Viktor Orbán, presently prime minister of Hungary, 
spoken as part of his inauguration speech in the Hungarian Parliament on 10 
May 2014. “Respected House! We have to serve, so that the state-structure 
and the government which frame the common life of the nation be constantly 
animated by soul, goal and sense, be always determined by the knowledge of 
and responsibility in the common fate. With all my strength I want to serve 
this command. I beg the Good Lord that, if he has brought me that far, if he 
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has carried me on eagle-wings, then he strengthens me, in order to be able to 
meet the responsibility awaiting me. I beg that my acts be always governed by 
faith and insight. Soli Deo Gloria – Glory to God alone.”
Two related questions arise: 1. May a Prime Minister become such out of 
the grace of God – thereby borrowing the legitimacy argument employed by 
absolute rulers?; 2. If the frame of the nation is the “state structure”, then 
where is the place of the Hungarians who live beyond the borders? Is there a 
duplication of the state, and beyond the internationally-recognised Hungary 
is there a shadow “Large Hungary” that incorporates the Hungarian nationals 
who live in other states like Romania, Ukraine or Serbia? Or does the term 
“state structure” only denote the machinery that works within the borders, so 
the Hungarians beyond them do not form part of the nation? Does it mean 
that their real role is limited to assuring that power remains in the hands of the 
leader, who enjoys the goodwill of God?
ON THE MYTH OF EQUALITY OF NATIONALS  
AND OF THEIR  RELIABILITY
Contrary to all other claims, Hungarian nationals in fact do not have one 
set of equal rights. While protagonists of naturalisation on a preferential basis 
stress that there are no two different classes of nationals, in fact there are 
several classes of Hungarian nationals.
The table below does not show all the entitlements (rights) and all the 
reference bases. Still, it unequivocally proves that the Hungarian legal order 
– and the political force behind it – creates at least five different classes of 
Hungarian nationals,21 and allocates them different benefits and drawbacks. 
Or, to put it in a more neutral way, it provides different opportunities in 
fundamental matters such as taxation, national defence, and forming the 
popular will.
21  More classes could be formed. Health minister regulation 59/2007. (XII. 29.) EüM on the 
support of the health care of Hungarians living beyond the border only covers “persons living 
in the Serbian Republic or Ukraine and declaring themselves to be Hungarian” irrespective of 
whether they are Hungarian nationals or not. This is a clear differentiation between Hungarian 
nationals who live in those countries and those who live beyond the borders, but in other 
countries. The Act on national higher education (Act No CCIV of 2011) permits students 
who come from the countries where the Status law is applicable to work in their countries 
of origin, instead of Hungary, if they were educated without having to pay a tuition fee. All 
other Hungarian nationals must work in Hungary a given number of years in exchange for the 
tuition-free education, no matter where their residence is. 
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Table 1 Different classes of Hungarian nationals
Benefit/privilege Remark / base of 
comparison
Drawback Remark / base of 
comparison
Hungarian 
Nationals (HN) 
living in Hungary
May vote in 
national elections 
in individual 
districts
HN living abroad, 
without an address 
in Hungary
Military labour 
obligation
Civic defence 
obligation
Personal income 
tax payment
HN without 
Hungarian 
address, living 
abroad
HN living 
abroad, but with 
a Hungarian 
address
May vote in 
national elections 
in individual 
districts
No payment of 
personal income 
tax if outside 
country for more 
than 183 days in 
the given year
HN without 
an address 
in Hungary, 
including those 
naturalised on a 
preferential basis 
(NPB)
HN (and 
foreigners) living 
in Hungary and 
earning income
Voting in the 
national elections 
only personally 
at Hungarian 
representations 
abroad. Voting by 
mail not possible
HN living abroad 
without an address 
in Hungary, 
including NPB
HN appearing 
in a Hungarian 
registry, but 
without an 
address in 
Hungary = NPB
May vote by mail HN living in 
Hungary / HN who 
has an address in 
Hungary
May only vote 
on the national 
list but not for 
candidate in 
individual district
HN living in 
Hungary, or living 
abroad but with a 
Hungarian address 
HN in general, 
including those 
not appearing 
in any registry, 
but with a 
certificate of their 
nationality
May hold public 
office 
Is entitled 
to consular 
protection
May settle in 
Hungary and 
the EU
Has a right to 
education
Immigrant 
foreigner
Must die in 
the defence of 
Hungary
Excluded from 
elections
Immigrant 
foreigner
HN living abroad 
but appearing in 
a registry or with 
an address in 
Hungary
Latent HN 
who has a right 
to acquire 
certification 
of Hungarian 
nationality
May become an 
EU citizen any 
time
Third country 
(non-EU) national
Practically no 
rights attached 
to nationality. 
(including the 
right to return) 
can be exercised 
before the 
certificate is 
acquired
Third country 
immigrants in 
Hungary.
HN living in 
Hungary or 
abroad, with a 
document proving 
HN
The recognition of the different categories of Hungarian nationals has 
become a textbook truth and is recognised by the teaching material used at 
the National University of Public Service (Cserny 2013:139). The admission 
of the different classes is not accompanied by a detailed explanation, and the 
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feeble efforts that are made to explain the differences are less than convincing. 
When addressing the difference between the voting rights of Hungarians 
living in Hungary and those living abroad without a Hungarian address, it 
notes 
“The existence of the two categories is unfortunate. Nevertheless 
such limitation on the voting rights of those living abroad may 
be considered proportionate and justifiable, as they do not share 
the everyday life, therefore it is not certain that decisions of the 
Parliament affect them in the same way as those living within 
the borders. However, they still have the option to influence 
public matters” (Cserny, 2013:140).
Let us take seriously – no matter how difficult it is – the textbook from 
which future public officials learn! Close reading reveals the following:
1.  The deprivation of a Hungarian national who has no address in Hungary 
from the right to vote in an individual district may be proportionate and 
justifiable. Or it may not. The text does not go as far as to state that it is 
justifiable, which reveals serious concerns/inconvenience on the part of 
the author.
2.  What could the possible justification be? “Living the everyday life” and 
being affected by the decisions of the Parliament? I fully agree with this 
criterion. Those people who take part in the life of a community should 
be considered members of the political community which governs itself 
through its elected Parliament. But: settled foreigners (immigrants) meet 
these criteria as well! Consequently, they should also have voting rights 
in the national elections as they are also part of everyday life and are 
bound by Hungarian laws. They also belong to the people of the country. 
The textbook does not consider this “side effect” of its argument.
3.  Those living beyond the borders “still possess the option to influence 
public matters”. Justification (determining what militates allowing them 
influence) is replaced by the repetition of the fact that they are entitled to 
influence public matters. If the (unrevealed) justifying factor is the fact 
that some Parliamentary decisions affect them, then nearly seven billion 
people could be entitled to vote, as some decisions of the Hungarian 
legislator (e.g. visa rules, taxation regulations, etc.) affect every human 
being.
The myth of the equality of the nationals is sibling to the belief that fellow 
nationals are more trustworthy (reliable) than foreigners. In the seventieth 
year of the Hungarian holocaust, when once again news about book-burning 
surfaced, in a year when elections to the European Parliament propelled 
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more far right MPs into the ranks than ever before, in a year when Ukrainian 
nationals are attacking each other with machine guns, tanks and air forces, 
perhaps we may justify questioning the fiction that fellow nationals are more 
trustworthy than foreigners. 
Nevertheless, the Hungarian legal system – as with many other legal orders 
– has abundant rules which exclude third country nationals and EU citizens 
from certain professions. Here is a quick and incomplete list: president of the 
republic, government official, most of the public officials, judge, prosecutor, 
armed security guard, wildlife guard, member of the forestry service, 
professional hunter, fisheries guard, public space controller.22 The question, 
“Why should a Hungarian Christian democrat trust a Hungarian Nazi more 
than they should an Austrian Christian Democrat?” cannot be answered. Why 
could the latter not guard our forests or banks? Why could a person with 
a Hungarian law degree but British nationality not serve as a better judge 
than his Hungarian counterpart? There is no response which goes beyond 
superstition. All conceivable answers go back to tribal allegiance, blood 
community, extended family of the deep past, our predestined fate. But it 
should be borne in mind that our “common fate”, our history, could be read 
as a history of being divided among ourselves. Start with Máté Csák, the self-
appointed landlord and ruler of large portions of the country in the 13 and 
14th centuries. Continue with Ferenc Rákóczi’s fight against the king in the 
18th century, and then the 1848–1849 revolution, the commune in 1919, the 
Nazi takeover in 1944, the 1956 revolution and so on. Hungarian fate can be 
read as an endless chain of oppositional activity, the incessant perpetuation of 
adversarial movement. In fact there are few nations whose history is free from 
civil wars, insurgencies, or bitter infighting.
The thesis according to which the fellow national is more trustworthy than 
the foreigner is politico-philosophically an overgeneralisation, if the opposite 
cannot (is not allowed to) be proven. Nor is this contention supported by 
history. Regretfully, it reflects the enemy-creating mentality which makes the 
holding of dual nationality so suspicious and which probably goes back to the 
French revolution that led to the setting up of popular armies, thereby making 
enemies of the whole (male) population of an opposing country. 
22  Before Hungary’s accession to the EU Judit Tóth composed a list of 44 lines specifying 
functions/jobs which could only be perfomed by Hungarian nationals. Tóth (2014:48 -50).
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THE SUSPICIOUS FOREIGNER
The ethnicising, blood-based and trust-requiring conception of nationality 
leads to the perception of the nationals of another nation with which the given 
state is at war as enemies, even if those persons have deep roots in the country 
of residence; for example, through their local families. 
Perhaps stored in the deeper layers of memory, and worth recalling, is 
that during the First World War both the Central Powers and the Entente 
interned civilian nationals (men) of the other side. In 1918, in Germany, more 
than 100000 foreign civilians (not prisoners of war!) were detained. The 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy kept approximately an equal number of Serbian 
nationals under its control, and France interned more than 60000 enemy 
civilians. Great Britain was not hesitant either in this regard: as early as in 
November 1915, 32440 German, Austrian and Hungarian civilians had been 
detained (Stibbe, 2006: 7-8). Czarist Russia had more than 300000 enemy 
civilians in detention by the end of 1917. (Stibbe, 2006:8)
An infamous event in the Second World War was the internment of 
Japanese, Germans, and Italians living in the United States. Based on the 
decisions of President Roosevelt, several thousand persons were interned, 
including many who were nationals of the United States.23 Not only were 
31000 “enemy aliens” confined to designated places, but the US also offered 
to allow Latin American states to send enemy aliens from their territory to 
the US. This led to the transfer of 6600 persons from fifteen Latin American 
states.24 The number of US nationals with Japanese backgrounds who had to 
sell their possessions and move to remote, designated places was even larger; 
it exceeded 100000. The large scale internment of the Japanese shows the 
dangers of the ethnicisation of nationality. Ethnicity and legal status merge and 
either of them is enough to make a person a target of discriminative treatment. 
In 1988 Congress adopted Statute No. 100-383 in which it acknowledged “the 
fundamental injustice of the evacuation, relocation, and internment of United 
States citizens and permanent resident aliens of Japanese ancestry during 
World War II.” 
Collective stigmatisation has not ceased with the taking hold of human rights 
after 1945. Three years after the US had apologised for injustices committed 
against the Japanese population, the United Kingdom took measures against 
“enemy nationals”, albeit this terminology was not used. During the 1990-
23  US national Archives: Brief Overview of the World War II Enemy Alien Control Program 
http://www.archives.gov/research/immigration/enemy-aliens-overview.html (2014-07-26)
24 Ibid.
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1991 Iraqi-Kuwaiti conflict around thirty people were held as prisoners of 
war because they were considered to be active or reserve members of the Iraqi 
army25, and more than a hundred Iraqi nationals and nationals of other Arabic 
states – who were not involved in the conflict – were expelled and detained 
with a view to removal (Walsh, 1998).
The UK procedure differed from those of the two World Wars as it affected 
significantly fewer persons and, formally, was an alien police procedure 
conducted against individuals whose “departure from the United Kingdom 
would be conducive to the public good for reasons of national security” 
(Walsh, 1998:268-269). Still, the closed procedure, the withholding of 
relevant information, and the non-judicial nature of the review has led 
commentators to conclude that the struggle between the rule of law and the 
logic of securitising was won, once again, by the latter (Walsh, 1998: 289 
-292, with further references). 
THE CHANGING ASSESSMENT OF DUAL NATIONALITY
“Dual nationality is an undesirable phenomenon, detrimental both to the 
friendly relations between nations and the well-being of the individuals 
concerned,” wrote Bar-Yaacov in his monograph on dual nationality in 1961 
(Kochenov, 2010:6 quoting Bar-Yaacov, 1961). This thought has prevailed 
among the views on nationality practically since the birth of nationality 
rules created in the wake of nationalist movements (Howard, 2005:700-702; 
Pogonyi 2011: 685,688). The 1963 “Convention on the Reduction of Cases 
of Multiple Nationality and on Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple 
Nationality” adopted under the aegis of the Council of Europe26 in its 
preamble, exposed the justification for the convention states: 
“Considering that cases of multiple nationality are liable to 
cause difficulties and that joint action to reduce … the number 
of cases of multiple nationality … corresponds to the aims of 
the Council of Europe.”
Article 1 prohibited dual or multiple nationality in the cases when a person 
of full age acquired by her own free will, by means of naturalisation, option 
or recovery, the nationality of another state party. The state whose nationality 
the person had possessed was not entitled to permit the retention of that 
25 The number has changed in light of successful review procedures.
26 Strasbourg, 6 May 1963, ETS, 043 
48 BOLDIZSÁR NAGY
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  2 (2014) 
nationality. The Protocol of 1977 attached to the convention did not challenge 
that and the 1963 treaty is still in force. Only four parties to the convention 
have changed their minds since 1963 and have withdrawn from this 
obligation, in accordance with the convention.27 The second protocol to the 
convention was adopted in 199328, and in narrowly-defined cases (migration 
to the naturalising country, marriage, etc.) permitted dual nationality, but still 
prohibited the extension of a second nationality to a person who did not move 
to the naturalising state. 
A change in the approach to dual nationality was brought by the 1997 
“Convention on Nationality”29 of the Council of Europe. This new text obliged 
state parties to accept dual nationality in a narrow set of cases, in line with the 
1993 Protocol to the 1963 Convention. These cases are: when the child by her 
birth, ex lege becomes a dual national (Article 14 § (1) a); and when concluding 
a marriage automatically entails the acquiring of the new nationality, without 
losing the existing one. In all other cases this convention also entitles the 
state to deprive of nationality those who – like in cases of naturalisation in 
the simplified procedure – voluntarily acquire a new nationality (Article (7 § 
(1) a)). Exactly this provision was invoked by Slovakia when, as a retorsion 
to the preferential naturalisation introduced by Hungary, it changed its law 
on nationality and threatened all those who voluntarily acquired a foreign 
nationality with deprivation of their Slovak nationality.30
The more relaxed approach to dual nationality does not reflect a weakening 
of the myth according to which the fellow national is more trustworthy than 
the foreigner. Rather, it is the result of the increased impact of human rights. 
It reflects a more robust respect for the equality of the sexes (and genders), 
family life, and individual self-determination, and it also serves to smoothen 
political and practical links between the migrants’ country of origin and their 
new home, as is exemplified in the German-Turkish context. 
27  Belgium (2007) France (2008) Italy and Luxembourg (2009) List of declarations made 
with respect to treaty No.043 http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.
asp?NT=043&CV=1&NA=12&PO=999&CN=999&VL=1&CM=9&CL=ENG(2014-07- 
26) Of the twelve parties only Germany has withdrawn completely from the convention.
28  Second Protocol Amending the Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality 
and Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality, Strasbourg, 2 February 1993. ETS. 
149. It only has two parties.
29 6 November 1997, ETS No. 166.
30  National Council of the Slovak Republic, Law No. 40/1993. on nationality in the Slovak 
Republic. (13 January 1993.) The deprivation of nationality was introduced by Law No. 
250/2010 T.t. following a decision of the Slovak Parliament of 26 May 2010. For comment, 
see: Gyeney (2013:163-165).
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At a rhetorical level many nationality rules still require faithfulness to the 
country, its defence, and the treatment as (personal) enemies all those whom 
the political leadership deem to be enemies.31
All this leads to the conclusion formulated by Christian Joppke that 
nationality law is following a bifurcated path. One tries to make the relations 
between the national and the state “thick”, “real” and substantive, impregnating 
the legal bond with socio-cultural elements, and the other accepts a “light” 
notion of nationality according to which differences between nationals and 
settled foreigners, or at least between a national and a national of a member 
state of a group of integrating states (EU, Nordic Union, the Benelux Union) 
are gradually disappearing (Joppke, 2010:12-19.) 
This duality enables the official discourse about preferential naturalisation. 
That discourse presents the Hungarian nationality as a thick one, reflecting 
fidelity and belonging, a legal and political bond that forms and reflects 
personal identity. At the same time it trivialises the other nationality of the 
dual national and assumes a much less intense relationship with that other 
state. In that context, no mutual trust and commitment is assumed. 
VISA AS STIGMA
Making access to dual nationality easier generates the impression that 
states look at foreigners with less suspicion. This illusion is defeated by the 
international visa system which is the most developed regime for collective 
stigmatisation. Making entry dependent on an individual permit (the visa) is 
a consequence of the First World War that made whole peoples into enemies 
(Torpey, 2000: 111-116). Thus, the freedom of travel and immigration, which 
prevailed almost everywhere before 1914, ceased to exist.32 Nationals of the 
enemy states could no longer travel according to their whim, as contemporaries 
of Tolstoy or Geothe and even before them the lads on their way to becoming 
masters of a profession or students attending foreign universities in the 
31  A perfect illustration is offered by the Hungarian oath of nationality “...I swear that I consider 
Hungary my home country, I wll be a faithful national of Hungary, will respect and obey the 
Fundamental Law and the Laws. I will defend my home country according to my strength and 
serve it according to my capabilities”. Fidelity, fight, service… What if the other nationality 
expects the same? What should dual nationals in Crimea or Eastern Ukraine do? On which 
side of the barricade should they show up?
32  Limitations on immigration were introduced by the United States in the second half of the 
19th century and, naturally, freedom of immigration did not apply in the closed Asian empires.
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medieval ages could.33
Today the US waives visa obligation for the nationals of 37 states and 
for the inhabitants of Taiwan.34 This list of preferred states even excludes 
some EU member states, namely Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland and Romania. 
The list includes the remaining EU members and of all the other countries 
only six states/territories, each of which have more than 6 million inhabitants: 
Australia (23 million), Chile (18), Japan (128), South Korea (50), Switzerland 
(8), and Taiwan (23). Consequently, more than six billion persons can only 
admire the Statute of Liberty if they receive an individual permit to do so. 
Otherwise, they do not have the liberty to go there.35
In the spring of 2014, the EU list of states the nationals of which did not 
need a visa to enter contained 38 states and 3 territories (Hong Kong, Macau, 
Taiwan).36 Considering that the 28 EU member states may be added to these 
38, the list is more generous than that of the US. Nevertheless, it still excludes 
most of the developing world, including China, India and most of Sub-
Saharan Africa, and only exempts from the obligation some Latin-American 
countries.
Looking at the larger picture, one may note that, on average, nationals of 
OECD countries were visa-obliged in only 93 states in 2006, and nationals of 
non-OECD countries in 156 (Neumayer, 2006:78). 
What justifies the issuance of a visa, the requirement for which largely did not 
exist before the 20th century? More precisely: how do states, which introduce 
visa obligations against persons seen as pawns in a game, or considered a 
threat, justify their introduction? Justification normally starts from the idea of 
collective sanction (punishment) or collective stigmatisation. The punishment 
argument is directed against the government of the visa-obliged population. 
The visa-introducing state opposes the policy of the given government and, 
in retaliation, forces the population of the country to apply for a (wilfully 
deniable) visa. The requirement of a visa in these cases serves as a foreign 
33  Obviously neither serfs bound to the land and their landlords nor the very poor could utilise 
this freedom. But that does not deny its legal existence.
34  http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/english/visit/visa-waiver-program.html#countries 
(2014-07- 26.)
35  The champions of exclusion are authoritarian states such as North Korea and Saudi Arabia. 
Similarly, the Socialist states required visas of everyone except nationals of other socialist 
states.
36  Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose 
nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing external borders and those whose 
nationals are exempt from that requirement (OJ L 81/1., 21.3.2001). Annex II. as amended.
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policy tool (Meloni, 2006:37). The visa becomes a collective stigma when 
it is based on the presumption that the whole population of the visa-obliged 
country constitutes a threat, either from a national security point of view, or 
as potential illegal immigrants. That sort of visa collectively stigmatises the 
not-yet-entered many for the deeds of the few fellow nationals who may have 
violated the rules of the destination country (Meloni, 2006:40). 
This three-pronged approach (foreign policy, security threat, and illegal 
immigration) characterises EU visa regulation: “The determination of those 
third countries whose nationals are subject to the visa requirement … is 
governed by … a variety of criteria relating inter alia to illegal immigration, 
public policy and security, … the European Union’s external relations with 
third countries, consideration also being given to the implications of regional 
coherence and reciprocity.”37
What is wrong with the justification of the visa obligation (Guild, 2003:92-
97)? 
1.  On the basis of the actions of a few it makes everyone a subject of 
suspicion and a victim of collective punishment (the visa). At the root 
of this usually there is nothing more than unreliable statistics and self-
fulfilling prophecy. The number of visas denied should be an index of 
the scale of the danger of illegal immigration, but the cause for denying a 
visa is the anticipated illegal immigration itself. In other words, it is not 
the number of undocumented immigrants who are actually caught which 
triggers the visa obligation, but the fact that, fearing illegal immigration, 
authorities a priori deny them a visa – which obviously leads to a large 
number of denied visas, which in turn “proves” the danger of illegal 
immigration. A classical vicious circle.38
2.  Visa requirements used in interstate relations in order to promote political 
goals unrelated to migration affect the whole population. The population 
becomes prisoner of a political confrontation, a pawn in a chess game. 
If the authoritarian political system is the target, the innocent population 
bears the brunt. To exacerbate matters. if the political opponent is the 
opponent of an EU member state, then the common visa list excludes the 
affected people not only from the relevant EU member state, but from 
all, (with the potential exception of the UK and Ireland which pursue 
37  Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose 
nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing external borders and those whose 
nationals are exempt from that requirement (OJ L 81/1., 21.3,2001), preamble, paragraph (5)
38  See, for example, the infamous regulation of the US which is based (partly) on the ’proportion 
of visa denials’ from all visa applications.
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independent visa policies). On the other hand, the exclusion extends 
to Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland as they joined the 
common regime in order to become part of the Schengen area without 
internal border controls.
3.  The visa requirement is an ill-conceived tool for maintaining national 
security or public order by threatening people out of the territory. 
If individuals are known threats, their entry may be denied – even if 
otherwise they would not need a visa. Border control agents can keep 
them out, or arrest them if they are silly enough to try entering a country 
as a known threat. The SIS II system in the EU and the different national 
registers of undesirable immigrants serve this purpose. If an individual 
has not yet been identified as a national security threat, then the visa 
procedure will not reveal it, as those with menacing intent can create 
perfect covers for themselves.
4.  The visa requirement prevents asylum seekers from reaching safe 
territories. 
5.  To exacerbate matters the visa requirement is not effective in respect of 
its main goals.39
Let us address the above five critical remarks!
There are no reliable statistics about the nexus between the efficiency of the 
visa policy and the number of undocumented migrants. But it is a trivial fact 
that the majority of migrants who become illegal have arrived legally (with a 
visa, or as visa-free travellers) and become illegal by way of overstaying or 
changing their status (for example, by taking up employment while having 
arrived under the rubric of “student”) (Neamayer, 2006:74, Frontex, 2014:52). 
In the European Union the number of illegal migrants that are caught is more 
greatly influenced by whether one has to flee their country of origin or not, 
and whether asylum seekers are statistically registered as illegal migrants. 
In fact, the number of illegal migrants has decreased for the last five years 
(Frontex, 2014:72, Statistical Annex, Table 4).
The introduction of a visa obligation as a foreign policy tool in essence 
deprives the population of the target country of their identity as private 
individuals and identifies them only as members of a political community, 
a community that, as a whole, is perceived as threatening. This was the case 
(twice) when Canada restored visa requirements for Czech nationals because 
39  Reasons for denying visas by EU member states are not published. In 2012 4,8 % of all C-type 
visa applications were refused. The range was large: for Algeria denials amounted to 27% of 
all applicants, in the case of Iran it was 8%, whereas less than 1% of Russian and Belorussian 
applicants got a negative response (Frontex, 2014:17).
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of the large number of asylum requests from Czech Roma (and did the same 
once and threatened to do the same again for Hungary). All the nationals 
of the Czech Republic were punished (and all Hungarians were put under 
pressure) because of the undesirable acts of a few thousand fellow nationals 
who in fact committed no crime as applying for asylum is not an offence 
(Tóth, 2013:38-40). 
Protecting national security and public order with the help of visas is 
an illusion. Denial of a visa may screen out the pickpockets, the beggars, 
potentially illegal sellers or potential prostitutes, but the process is incapable 
of identifying the yet-unknown culprits of large scale terror attacks. Neither 
does it exclude the leaders of trafficking rings or drug smuggling cartels. 
These persons can easily meet the visa requirements: they will have return air 
tickets, hotel reservations, and available financial resources.40 They will only 
be caught if it is known from other sources that they pose a danger. This bitter 
lesson was learned in September 2001. All the terrorists involved had visas or 
valid residence permits. 
Most critical is the nexus between visa and asylum. Today, the Syrian case 
painfully shows how visa obligations act as obstacles to safety. If they did not, 
then could it happen that out of 2,9 million refugees, only about one hundred 
thousand would manage to reach the European Union41, 1.1 million get to 
Lebanon, eight hundred thousand to Turkey, and six hundred thousand to 
40  This is what the EU Visa Code (Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas, OJ L 243/1, 
15.9.2009) requires from the visa applicant in its Article 14:
     (a) documents indicating the purpose of the journey;
      (b) documents in relation to accommodation, or proof of sufficient means to cover his 
accommodation;
      (c) documents indicating that the applicant possesses sufficient means of subsistence both for 
the duration of the intended stay and for the return to his country of origin or residence, or for 
the transit to a third country into which he is certain to be admitted, or that he is in a position 
to acquire such means lawfully, …;
      (d) information enabling an assessment of the applicant’s intention to leave the territory of the 
Member States before the expiry of the visa applied for.”
41  The figure is uncertain. Eurostat’s figure for 2013 is 50470. (Asylum applicants and first 
instance decisions on asylum applications: 2013 Eurostat, Staistics in Focus, Table 2, page 
5.). The UNHCR in July 2014 mentioned 123600 persons, admitting that the figure may be 
too large as some have submitted more than one application. “U.N. asks Europe to take Syrian 
refugees as region saturated” http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/11/us-syria-crisis-
refugees-idUSKBN0FG1ZZ20140711http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/11/us-syria-
crisis-refugees-idUSKBN0FG1ZZ20140711  (2014-07-26)
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Jordan? Even Iraq is home to more Syrian refugees (two hundred thousand) 
than the EU.42
Visa, as a block on the road to safety was applied during the Southern Slav 
war. Austria restored the visa obligation against the Bosnians starting from 2 
July 1992. Earlier, nationals of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
could enter Austria visa-free (Nagy, 2012:142). 
It is not denied that the abolition of a visa requirement may lead to a surge 
in asylum applications. Many of these applications for refugee status turn 
out to be unfounded – as happened after the EU abolished the visa obligation 
for Albania, Serbia and other Western Balkan states.43 However, this is not 
necessarily the case. The nationals of Latin America who got visa-free entry 
did not storm European refugee offices. Frequently, applicants who arrive 
visa-free from Serbia, Bosnia and Kosovo would in fact prefer to become 
long-term immigrants, not refugees. Many of them had lived in the country of 
application before and wished to return to the site of their refuge during the 
war in the Balkans. As regular immigration is foreclosed to them, they try the 
asylum route. That is a lose-lose situation, as dealing with the great number 
of unfounded applications demands resources which should be devoted to 
those fleeing actual persecution or other serious harm, and these applications 
inevitably end up being denied with the removal and long-term banning of 
the applicant from EU territory. Still, the solution is not to restore the visa 
obligation even if the possibility for this has been established, entitling 
the Commission of the EU to act.44 Rather, the appropriate response to an 
increasing number of applications is to create a fast and efficient procedure 
that can render decisions in such cases within days or weeks, as Sweden, 
Germany and Canada have done.
42  UNHCR: Inter-Agency Regional Response for Syrian Refugees Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Turkey 6 - 12 July 2014, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php#_ga=1.1874141
20.1793988378.1405419596
43  Of all the applications submitted by persons who could enter visa-free, 97% (33000 
applications) were submitted from the five states which were trasferred to the visa-free list in 
2009 and 2011. (Albania, Bosnia-Herczegovina, FYRoM, Montenegro and Serbia) Frontex: 
Western Balkans Annual Risk Analysis 2014, Warsaw, 2014, 33
44  See point 2 of Article 1 of the 289/2013/EU regulation (OJ L 347/74, 20.12.2013) amending 
regulation 539/2001/EC listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession 
of visas when crossing external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that 
requirement.
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The stigmatising nature of the visa is most conspicuous in asymmetric 
bilateral situations, in which nationals of one of the partners are obliged to 
apply for visa and nationals of the other are free to enter.45
DOMESTIC BURDENS OF NATIONALITY
Nationality not only affords rights, it also entails obligations and puts 
limitations on one’s freedom. This chapter will not cover those state regulations 
that put a burden on everyone under a jurisdiction – that is, nationals and 
foreigners alike – even if those commands may be criticised from a human 
rights point of view. So it will not address the French prohibition on wearing 
the niqab in public places as that ban is not French-nationality specific; it 
applies to foreigners under French jurisdiction as well.46 The following points 
are concentrated on rules which put a burden on a person because she is the 
national of the state. The same rules would not apply to resident foreigners.
Naturally, space limitations prevent the full listing of such targeted rules, 
and nor can we delve into the details. The aim is simply to highlight that 
nationality of a country may be a bitter gift.
Compulsory military servvice
Compulsory military service has been central to thinking about nationality. 
Perhaps it is the most important “duty of the national”. Even at the time of 
the French Revolution people could be compulsorily drafted and pressed into 
military service. Nevertheless, it only became general practice before and 
during the “Great War” (i.e. at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th 
centuries) (Csapody, 2005). Today it is on the retreat. Only a relatively small 
number of states still retain the institution of compulsory military service 
in peacetime, among them a few European states (Estonia, Finland, Russia, 
Switzerland, and Turkey). 
45  Two examples: Hungarians do not need a visa to enter Tunisia, but Tunisians need one to 
visit Hungary. A similar assymetry is present in the US - Polish relationship. See further the 
Seventh report [of the Commission of the EU] on certain third countries’ maintenance of 
visa requirements in breach of the principle of reciprocity. COM(2012) 681 final, Brussels, 
26.11.2012.
46  The European Court of Human Rights (somewhat surprisingly) has found that ban compatible 
with the European Convention on Human Rights. Case of S.A.S. v. France, (Application no. 
43835/11) Grand Chamber judgment of 1 July 2014.
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But, in times of military conflict most states still call upon their nationals 
(at least the men) to join the armed forces. Military duty entails participation 
in a civil war or in an international conflict. A soldier participating in an 
international conflict may perceive it as a “just war”, a war in defence of the 
homeland, but this may also not be the case. A Russian soldier in Afghanistan 
in the 1980s or in Ukraine these days may very well distance himself from the 
political and military leaders’ goals, but nevertheless – at least in Afghanistan 
– does (did) not have the choice of denying service.
The inferno of civil war can once again be witnessed, this time in Ukraine: 
Ukrainian nationals are killing Ukrainian nationals, many of whom are mobilised 
civilians who are sent to the front against their will. The same applied when ethnic 
Hungarians of Voivodina (Serbia) had to fight in Kosovo in the Milošević army 
against ethnic Albanians, all being nationals of (rump) Yugoslavia. 
Fewer and fewer international conflicts are occurring. Their assessment 
depends on the political standpoint of the assessor.47 Military activity 
undertaken with the approval of the UN is legitimate. As far as I know, 
soldiers participating in these activities are either volunteers or professional 
servicemen, so their presence is not the fulfilment of a duty attached to 
nationality.
Whenever an international conflict unfolds and neither party enjoys the support 
of the UN, then the drafted soldier may find himself/herself in the military theatre 
against his/her will even if (s)he fundamentally opposes the action. Desertion 
amounts to treason and may swiftly lead to the death penalty meted out by a 
military tribunal. The only hope is that the international community will condemn 
the action of the state. This would entitle the person performing compulsory 
military service (or any military person under orders to commit a war crime or a 
crime against humanity) to refugee status – at least in the EU.48
47  Was the attack against Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), or the bombing of Yugoslavia 
(1999) agression?
48  Article 9 paragraph (2) point e) of the Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country 
nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection; for a uniform status 
for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection; and for the content of the 
protection granted. It explains that “persecution” may consist of “prosecution or punishment 
for refusal to perform military service in a conflict, where performing military service would 
include crimes or acts falling within the scope of the grounds for exclusion” [from refugee 
status]. UNHCRS’ Handbook on Procedures contains a similar idea: “Where … the type of 
military action, with which an individual does not wish to be associated, is condemned by 
the international community as contrary to basic rules of human conduct, punishment for 
desertion or draft-evasion could, in the light of all other requirements of the definition, in itself 
be regarded as persecution” (Handbook, 1992: point 171).
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Prohibition of apostasy
In May 2014 the US Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research 
Center published a study49 which identified rules that sanction the punishment 
of the abandonment of the Islamic faith in 23 African, Asian and Middle-
Eastern countries. In countries that closely obey Sharia the punishment is 
death. International press has reported on several cases in which the person 
to whom capital punishment had been meted out was in the end released due 
to international pressure. A recent example is that of Ms Mariam Ebrahim of 
Sudan, who married a Christian man. She was sentenced to 100 lashes for 
adultery and to death for apostasy in May 2014. (She has always considered 
herself a Christian, but according to Islamic rules she counted as Muslim, so 
having a relationship with a Christian was adultery.) Amnesty International 
collected more than a million signatures protesting the sentence and finally 
she was allowed to leave Sudan.50 The prohibition of apostasy sets apart the 
foreigner of whatever religion and the Muslim national, as punishment only 
threatens the latter (or, perhaps, all resident Muslims).51
Ban on emigration
Nowhere is the similarity between the faithful subject of the prince, king 
or emperor and the national of a sovereign state more pronounced than in the 
way the state binds a national to itself in her/his capacity as a labour force, 
potential soldier or financial resource (Torpey, 2000:18). Historically, the 
fight was not about the right to enter. It was about the right to leave! Feudalist 
and mercantilist approaches considered humans to be factors of production 
which would be lost in case of emigration, for which those societies (rulers, 
landlords) were not ready. One may recall rules that existed as late as the 
second half of the 19th century when European countries purported to control 
and manage emigration. The right to leave any country, including one’s own, 
49  Laws Criminalizing Apostasy in selected Jurisdictions The Law Library of Congress, Global 
Legal Research Center May, 2014
50  Sudanese woman spared death sentence for apostasy arrives in Italy 
      http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/24/sudanese-woman-meriam-ibrahim-spared-
death-sentence-apostasy-italy  (2014-07-26) 
51  Space and time limitations prevent further scrutiny of the relevant penal codes with a view to 
establishing their personal scope.
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have become part of post-World War II human rights documents,52 but in 
practice many states have ignored them until today. Whoever lived in Central 
and Eastern Europe during Socialist times knows that hardly anything was 
more valuable than an exit visa and a passport allowing departure from the 
country. Leaving the country without a permit or denying return to it after a 
legal trip abroad was a crime and still is in the presently existing dictatorships. 
It is a generally held view that control of the borders and of emigration 
and immigration is an indispensable part of sovereignty. However, as 
history before World War I and the present practice of the EU show, this 
is not the case (Nagy, 2012:35). Naturally, the control of border-crossings 
may have useful functions (apprehension of criminals, identifying children 
that are escaping their parents, preventing smuggling, or creating a barrier to 
epidemics) but none of these necessitate that the national be allowed to leave 
only in possession of an exit permit. Exit permits are only needed if the state 
wants to exercise decisive control over its nationals. Banning travel abroad 
under normal conditions – that is, when the state does not intend to hold the 
whole population as its hostage – is conceivable in strictly-determined cases, 
such as criminals fleeing procedure, in the case of persons with extremely 
large public debts, or when the person’s identity is in doubt (until clarified). 
One-child policy
The relationship between the state and the population living on its territory 
may become complicated. On the one hand, it may entail limitations on 
abortion for demographic or for religious-moral reasons. I will not address 
that problematique here, as – to the best of my knowledge – these rules apply 
to everyone on the territory, and their application is not limited to nationals. 
On the other hand, state interference with family planning may take the 
52  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states in its article 12 paragraph (2): 
“Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own”. Paragraph (4) of the same 
Article assures the right to return. In the European Court of Justice case C-33/07 (Jipa) the 
court ruled that someone who had been removed from Belgium and therefore punished by a 
three year prohibition from leaving his home-country, Romania, must be allowed to leave, 
since a ban must be exceptional and rooted in the individual threat posed by the given person, 
which here was not the case. “The fact that a citizen of the Union has been subject to a measure 
repatriating him from the territory of another Member State, where he was residing illegally, 
may be taken into account by his Member State of origin for the purpose of restricting that 
citizen’s right of free movement only to the extent that his personal conduct constitutes a 
genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to one of the fundamental interests of society” 
- point 26.
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form of limiting the number of children a couple is supposed to have, as is 
the practice in China. This limitation is nationality-specific.53 The inhuman 
nature of the one-child policy is not in doubt as the violation of the rules 
may be sanctioned with a heavy fine, loss of public office, confiscation of 
personal assets and artificial sterilisation.54 States are divided about whether 
this generally-applied rule entitles those who flee China to refugee status55, 
but it is beyond doubt that the one child policy is a nationality specific burden.
COMBINING THE THREADS – CONCLUSIONS AND 
SUGGESTIONS
This study is not an assault on the institution of nationality. I take note of 
the fact that a great number of privileges (for example, in the EU: freedom of 
movement, the right to equal treatment, specific rights of EU citizens) derive 
from having a fortunate nationality. Neither am I forgetting that statelessness 
is even worse than having a less sought-after nationality
The study pursued several goals. First, it was written to show that the 
transformation of Hungarian public law, especially the rules related to 
nationality and national elections, has led to the construction of a contradictory 
system from the point of view of political philosophy. Second, it was designed 
to highlight the fact that certain nationalities place an unfair burden on those 
born into them. 
I showed that the public discourse and the law irreconcilably contradict 
the unrevealed political intentions behind them. This contradiction leads to 
the impossibility of an orderly and seamless, harmonious use of the legal 
concepts that appear in the legal texts. The government has turned against 
its own rhetoric of a decade ago. Then the government of the same political 
colour and of the same prime minister denied the link between belonging 
53  Order of the President of the People’s Republic of China No. 63 The Population and Family 
Planning Law of the People’s Republic of China, adopted at the 25th Meeting of the Standing 
Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on 
December 29, 2001, is hereby promulgated and shall go into effect as of September 1, 2002. 
Section 17. http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-10/11/content_75954.htm (26.07.2014.)
54  See e.g. the decision of the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia: SZNCK v MINISTER 
FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP, 28 May 2009 [2009] FMCA 399
      http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=search&docid=4a55c4c52&skip 
=0&query=SZNCK%20v%20MINISTER%20FOR%20IMMIGRATION%20&%20
CITIZENSHIP  (2014-07-26)
55 Ibid., referring back to the Refugee Review Tribunal’s position, refusing the application
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to the ethnic-cultural-historic nation and possessing Hungarian nationality. 
Now, at the level of rhetoric, the leading slogan is national reunification across 
borders with the help of the new public law regime: through preferential 
naturalisation and voting rights assigned to people who do not live in the 
country. But, in reality, this is not the real importance of the post 2010 setup. 
The new rules do not require any longer that the national declare herself to 
be Hungarian. Only descent from a former Hungarian national (of whatever 
ethnic-cultural background) and a minimal knowledge of the language are 
essential. This logic is imperial, it is clientele-building: descendants of the 
subjects of the Hungarian part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy may apply 
for preferential naturalisation and thereby become loyal voters of the power 
that acts to extend their opportunities.
In line with this, it has also become obvious that the idea of a self-governing 
political community is no longer applicable to Hungary.56 Power is not 
derived from the will of the Hungarian nationals, as 3-4 million of them are in 
effect “dumb”, without practical access to a national’s rights57. Nor can it be 
a product of the will of the population of Hungary as it includes hundreds of 
thousands of foreigners who have settled and are disenfranchised in national 
elections. “Popular will” is heavily influenced by more than a half million 
voters who have never lived in Hungary, but who as dual nationals have 
been preferentially naturalised and are entitled to vote on the national list of 
parties. The political community does not coincide with the Hungarian nation 
either, as several million people who identify themselves as Hungarian do not 
56  The doctrine of the illiberal state was announced in a speech by the Prime Minister, Mr 
Orbán, symbolically not at home, but in Romania, Tusnádfürdő. “[T]he Hungarian nation is 
not simply a group of individuals but a community that must be organised, reinforced and in 
fact constructed. And so in this sense the new state that we are constructing in Hungary is an 
illiberal state, a non-liberal state. It does not reject the fundamental principles of liberalism 
such as freedom, and I could list a few more, but it does not make this ideology the central 
element of state organisation, but instead includes a different, special, national approach.” 
He contrasted the illiberal state he plans to develop, with the liberal state of the years 1990 
-2010. “The liberal democracy was incapable of openly stating and committing the prevailing 
government, including through the use of its constitutional powers, to serving the interests 
of the nation with their work. And it in fact challenged the very idea of the existence of 
national interests. It did not commit the prevailing government to accepting that Hungarians 
living throughout the world are part of the Hungarian nation and to try and reinforce this 
community through its work. The liberal democracy and liberal Hungarian state did not 
protect community assets.” – Speech of Mr Viktor Orbán on 26 July 2014. http://www.
miniszterelnok.hu/in_english_article/_prime_minister_viktor_orban_s_speech_at_the_25th_
balvanyos_summer_free_university_and_student_camp  (2014-09-02)
57  Mere absence does not lead to loss of nationality, so the principle ius sanguinis is applicable 
without end.
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possess Hungarian nationality. So the population that expresses the popular 
vote as if it were a political community is in fact a set of people brought 
together by a capricious political will, primarily interested is perpetuating its 
power.
Moving beyond the misery of the conditions of Hungarian public law I 
argue that nationality in the 21st century functions exactly as feudal privileges 
did once upon a time. In agreement with Joseph Carens and Ayelet Shachar58 
I assert that the place of birth or the position of the parents determines the life-
chances of the newly-born. If we regard it as unjust that someone born a serf 
should remain a serf all her life, and a born aristocrat remains one throughout 
theirs, or if we refuse the idea that the citizen of a town may live where a 
peasant is not allowed to settle, then we have to regard it unjust (morally 
untenable) that the “blood” of the parents (nationality in ius sanguinis 
systems) or the place of birth (in ius soli systems) determine the cluster of 
rights and duties of the individual (Shachar, 2009: 8-10, 24, 27).  
What is the solution, then? A theory that prefers freedom and adheres to the 
inalienably equal dignity of every newly born must reduce the inequality of 
opportunities caused by the birthplace or by the nationality of the parents.59 
Several options are available. It is common to them that they accept 
the existence of a surrounding community and the necessity of a society. 
Nevertheless, the suggested solutions share the conviction that birth into a 
community must not turn into an immutable fate. Locke was clear on that: “It 
is plain then, by the practice of governments themselves, as well as by the law 
of right reason, that a child is born a subject of no country or government. He 
is under his father’s tuition and authority, till he comes to age of discretion; 
and then he is a freeman, at liberty what government he will put himself 
under, what body politic he will unite himself to…” (Locke, 1689/1764:§118) 
My suggestion is that the bundle of rights enjoyed in the community/
society should correlate to the attachment to that community. Of course 
this should be understood as the bundle beyond basic human rights which 
58  “Citizenship in Western liberal democracies is the modern equivalent of feudal privilege – an 
inherited status that greatly enhances one’s life chances. Like feudal birthright privileges, 
restrictive citizenship is hard to justify when one thinks about it closely.” (Carens 1987: 252); 
(Shachar, 2009:37-38).
59  For space reasons this study had to ignore the consequences of EU citizenship. This footnote 
nevertheless asserts that most of the benefits associated with nationality may be assured by 
entites smaller or larger than the state. See the consular protection offered by the EU, or the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, which at the moment may still be in its infancy, but 
together with NATO may already be a firmer guarantor of security than the national defence 
apparatus.
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everyone everywhere should enjoy. Time and exposure to the decisions of 
the community together should determine the measure of influence and duty 
to contribute to the continuous existence of that community. “Stakeholder 
citizenship”, says Rainer Bauböck, meaning that those persons should qualify 
as nationals (stakeholder citizens) whose lives are bound to the welfare of the 
given community. These are his words: “The notion of stakeholding expresses, 
first, the idea that citizens have not merely fundamental interests in the 
outcomes of the political process, but a claim to be represented as participants 
in that process. Second, stakeholding serves as a criterion for assessing 
claims to membership and voting rights. Individuals whose circumstances 
of life link their future well-being to the flourishing of a particular polity 
should be recognized as stakeholders in that polity with a claim to participate 
in collective decision-making processes that shape the shared future of this 
political community.” (Bauböck, 2007:2422). “Ius nexi” suggests Ayelet 
Shachar, who argues that, “What is required here is not mere physical presence 
in the territory but also the passage of time and social connectedness, the latter 
referring to the requisite ‘center of life’ criteria, which itself can be interpreted 
in more generous or more stringent way” (Shachar, 2009:178). She proposes 
that mere presence alone should not lead to nationality. Actual manifestations 
of participation would be required, which in turn entails consequences for 
long-term absence. In fact, Sachar proposes that a second generation born 
abroad would no longer inherit nationality if there were no real connections 
to the polity (Shachar, 2009:180). 
So, there are ways out from the jungle into which the Hungarian public 
laws adopted in the beginning of the 21st century have led. One only needs 
disciplined thinking and legislators who are receptive to the lessons of 
political-philosophy. 
REFERENCES
Arendt, Hanna (1958), The Origins of Totalitarianism, Second ed, Cleveland, 
Meridian Books, The World Publishing Company
Bakk Miklós (2008): Politikai közösség és identitás. Kolozsvár, Komp-Press Kiadó
Bar-Yaacov, Nissim(1961), Dual Nationality. London, Stevens and Sons
Bauböck, Rainer (2007), Stakeholder Citizenship and Transnational Political 
Participation: A Normative Evaluation of External Voting. Fordham Law Review. 
Vol. 75(5). pp. 2393–2447.
Carens, Joseph (1987): Aliens and citizens: the case for open borders. Review of 
Politics, Vol. 49. No. 2. pp. 251 – 273.
63NATIONALITY AS A STIGMA: THE DRAWBACKS OF NATIONALITY
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  2 (2014) 
Csapody Tamás (2005), Utak és útvesztők – a sorkötelezettség története. Valóság, 
http://www.valosagonline.hu/index.php?oldal=cikk&cazon=656&lap=0 
Cserny Ákos (ed.) (2013), Alkotmányjog. Budapest, Nemzeti Köszszolgálati Egyetem
Frontex (2014), Annual Risk Analysis, Warsaw http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/
Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2014.pdf (02.09.2014)
Goffman, Erving (1986), Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. New 
York, N.Y: Simon & Schuster
Guild, Elspeth (2003), The border abroad – visas and border controls. In: Kees 
Groenendijk, Elspeth Guild és Paul Minderhoud (eds.): In search of Europe’s 
Borders. The Hague, Kluwer, pp. 87–104.
Gyeney Laura (2013), Kettős állampolgárság az Európai Unió erőterében. Iustum 
Aequum Salutare Vol. IX., No. 2. pp.157–168.
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees HCR/IP/4/
Eng/REV.1 Geneva , UNHCR 1979 Reedited, January 1992
Howard, Marc Morjé (2005), Variation in Dual Citizenship Policies - in the Countries 
of the EU. International Migration Review Vol. 39(3) (Fall) pp. 697-720
Joppke, Christian (2010), The Inevitable Lightening of Citizenship. Archive of 
European Sociology (Archives européennes de sociologie), 2010, 51. 9 -32.
Kochenov, Dimitry (2010), Rounding up the Circle: The Mutation of Member States’ 
Nationalities under the Pressure of EU Citizenship, EUI Working Papers RSCAS 
2010/23
Locke, John (1689/1764), Second Treatise of Civil Government. https://ebooks.
adelaide.edu.au/l/locke/john/l81s/chapter8.html 
Meloni, Annalisa (2006) Visa Policy within the European Union Structure. Berlin, 
Springer, 
Molnár Tamás (2014), Remembering the forgotten: international legal regime 
protecting the stateless persons—stocktaking and new tendencies. US-China Law 
Review, Volume 11, Number 7, pp. 822-848.
Nagy Boldizsár (2012), A magyar menekültjog és menekültügy a rendszerváltozástól 
az Európai Unióba lépésig Erkölcsi, politikai-filozófiai és jogi vizsgálódások. 
Budapest, Gondolat, 2012.
Neumayer, Eric (2006), Unequal access to foreign spaces: how states use visa 
restrictions to regulate mobility in a globalized world. Transactions of the Institute 
of British Geographers, Vol. 31 No. 1.pp. 72-84.
Papp Imre (2003), A politikai részvételi jogok. In: Halmai Gábor és Tóth Gábor Attila 
(szerk.): Emberi jogok Budapest, Osiris, pp. 737 – 790.
Pogonyi, Szabolcs (2011), Dual citizenship and sovereignty. Nationalities Papers: The 
Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, Vol. 39, Issue 5, pp. 685-704.
Shachar, Ayelet (2009), The Birthright Lottery. Cambridge, Mass.Harvard University 
Press
Stibbe, Matthew (2006), The Internment of Civilians by Belligerent States during 
the First World War and the Response of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross. Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 5-19.
64 BOLDIZSÁR NAGY
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  2 (2014) 
Szarka László, Vizi Balázs, Majtényi Balázs és Kántor Zoltán (szerk.) (2007), 
Nemzetfogalmak és etnopolitikai modellek Kelet-Közép-Európában. Budapest, 
Gondolat, 2007.
Torpey, John (2000), The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the 
State. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
Tóth, Judit (2013) Roma migration from a legal perspective. In: Vidra Zsuzsa (szerk.): 
Roma migration to and from Canada. The Czech, Hungarian and Slovak case. 
Budapest, CEU Press, pp. 23-52.
Tóth Judit (2004): Státusjogok. Budapest, Lucidus Kiadó, Kisebbségkutatás könyvek
Tóth Pál Péter (1997), Haza csak egy van? Püski, 1997.
Walsh,Bernadette (1993), Detention and deportation of foreign nationals in the United 
Kingdom during the Gulf conflict. In: Rowe, Peter (ed.): The Gulf War 1990–91 in 
International and English Law, London Sweet & Maxwell, pp. 268-293.
Waterbury, Myra A (2010), Between State and Nation. Diaspora Politics and Kin-
State Nationalism in Hungary, New York, Palgrave Macmillan
